Report Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words - 15

Report - Essay Example This project management plan is to provide information for the implementation of an information management system project, within the confines of a health care institution. The project management approach consists of a project management team with the client’s project manager and the IT specialist’s project manager. The plan clearly outlines the project structure and governance. The plan lists the stakeholders the risks identified. The project is to take 207 days. This project plan presents a breakdown of the functions that will be included in the implementation of an information management system within the healthcare sector, with a specific focus on Curtin Hospital. The project aims at devising an information management system in a hospital in order to augment the conveyance of services through making patient information readily available. With the increased adopted of information technology within different sectors, the implementation of the information management system marks the beginning of the fundamental changes which the hospital shall implement in seeking to improve service delivery. The intended audience for the information management system project in Curtis hospital is the various project stakeholders who include senior management of the hospital, project sponsors and the project management team Information technology has become essential in the improvement of service delivery within many industries. The implementation of information management systems within the healthcare sector presents healthcare institutions with an opportunity to utilize technological methods to enhance service delivery. The hospital utilizes manual records for the majority of the hospital records. There is need to create a digital database for this information which will begin with the conversion of the paper based records into digital formats. The system will enhance the process of retrieving

The Last of the Mohicans - Accuracy Report Essay Example for Free

The Last of the Mohicans Accuracy Report Essay Question: To what extent is the film The Last of the Mohicans an accurate portrayal of historical events? The last of the Mohicans, the film, was based on a novel by James Fenemore Cooper. It is a fictional story set in an historical time. The movie is based on The French and Indian War also known as The 7 Year War. The war started in 1756 and ended in 1763. The French and English were fighting each other for the land between their two settlements and the possession of America. At the start of the movie, it tells you that the year is 1757, the third year of the war. But in fact 1757 was the second year of the war because the war started in 1756. This means that the third year of the war would have to have been 1758. The countries involved in the war were England and France plus the Native Americans (Huron, Ohawa and Mohawks). This was accurately portrayed in the film. The cause of conflict between the two countries was the fact that the English started to setting up farms in French Territory and the French werent to happy. There had been conflict before the war but this was the strew that broke the camels back. Some Native American tribes decided to side with the countries fighting by making deals with them. The Mohawks decided to side with England but the Huron and the Ohawa tribes decided to fight with the French because the French had always been better to the Native Americans then the English had been. The locations and their names were accurate in the film. The three forts were Fort William Henry, Fort Edward and Alburney. They were all placed inside the fought over land between the French and English settlement. In the film there were three Military Leaders. These were General Webb (British), Colonel Munro (British) and General Montcalm (French). It is a historical fact that these three men did exist during this time. The movies terrain was accurate to what it was like back then. They were situated in the mountains with lots of tree cover which made it hard too fight because it gave the troops more places to hide and made it easy to ambush a moving party. The Costumes of the actors and actress were accurate to what they wear back in those times. The Military wore the red coats with their black hats, black boots and black pants. The colonists were wearing everyday farming clothes that were worn and old and the Native Americans were wearing animal skins, feathers and strange hair styles as they did back then. The Native Americans used knives and spears as weapons, which were all hand made by their people like they would have been back then. The Troops and colonists used shoot guns, swords and those guns with the swords on the end, which would have been shipped over from England and France. The weapons were accurate to those that would have been used back then. The Native Americans and France used a different style of fighting to what the English used. The English would just stand in line and fire, making it easy for them to be shot because they were not protected. Where as the French and Native Americans would hide behind trees, bushes, etc, and fire from were they where. This way the English wouldnt know where they were and they had protection. We get to see in the movie that the Native Americans were very brutal in the way they killed people and they way they scalped their victims. The English  and French killed people as easily and quickly as possible. The Native Americans liked to make people suffer. But the Native Americans were more caring when it came to the way they respected the environment. Because they lived off the land, they respected the land and I tried to give back to the land. A good example of this in the film was at the start when they killed the dear. Once they had killed it, they prayed for it and thank it for giving them food to keep them alive. They called it brother like it was part of their family. The British Army didnt care much for the colonists. For all they were concerned, the colonists were there for their convenience. They were there to help them fight and win the war. Thats all they cared about. The colonists werent happy by this. They were promised by Munro that they could go help their families if they were under attack. But when this happened, Munro would not let them go. The colonists were extremely mad. They hated the British Army for this. But the British Army and the colonists needed to stick together to fight the war. Otherwise they would not win. If they went their separate ways, they would not have enough power to defeat the French. The French were nice to the Native Americans when they first settled but when it came to the war, all they wanted was for them to fight for the French and they didnt care about the rest of the deal they made with them. The English were the same but they had treated the Native Americans worse when they had settled, so not many Native Americans liked them. At Fort William Henry, the English didnt have enough man power to beat the French. With some of the colonist sneaking out to help their familles and no back up from Fort Edward, they had to surrender because they could not win. The French promised the English that they would become prisoners of war and would be safely lead back to Fort Edward were they could stay with their families and not be harmed. But the Native Americans didnt like this. They were promised that they could kill the English and scalp them but the French went back on their word. The Native Americans were extremely mad and ambushed the English Party while they were being escorted to Fort Edward. The Native Americans killed the English and the French and scalped them. Even though the movie was historical correct in most ways, there was still some fiction in it. It is true that there was an existence of a tribe called the Mohicans (later to disappear due to European settlement) but there is no proof that there was an existence of the three heroes (Nathaniel/Hawkeye, Uncas and Chingachcook) said to be the last of the Mohicans. Munro didnt send for his daughters in the middle of the war so they couldnt have been any romance between the eldest daughter and Nathaniel. And finally, they portrayed the English to be the heroes and the French to be the villains, when really both of the countries were in the wrong so none of them were heroes. The film is an accurate portrayal of historical events, as long as you take out the main characters, the love story and the hero and villains aspect. Everything else is historically correct, from what they wore, to what the terrain was like, to the countries involved, to what weapons they used.

Karl Marx: History as Explicable Human Activity Essay -- Philosophy Hi

History as Explicable Human Activity as Seen by Karl Marx Using phrases such as" innocent and childlike fantasies," Karl Marx unambiguously attacks the Hegelian philosophy preponderant during his time, citing in its concept of history an irrevocable divorce with reality. For Marx, history is exactly what it seems to be: a succession of human events in which ideas such as the division of labor, production, and revolution replace their immaterial Hegelian counterparts, if even such counterparts exist. In fact, Marx accuses the token historian of ignoring the fundamental aspects of actual human activity while instead concentrating upon non-actualized ideas at best and imaginary metaphysical concepts at worst. "History is nothing but the succession of separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, capital, and productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations." Marx resists any abstraction from this idea, believing that his materialistic ideas alone stand supported by empirical evidence which seems impossible to the Hegelian. His history then begin... Karl Marx: History as Explicable Human Activity Essay -- Philosophy Hi History as Explicable Human Activity as Seen by Karl Marx Using phrases such as" innocent and childlike fantasies," Karl Marx unambiguously attacks the Hegelian philosophy preponderant during his time, citing in its concept of history an irrevocable divorce with reality. For Marx, history is exactly what it seems to be: a succession of human events in which ideas such as the division of labor, production, and revolution replace their immaterial Hegelian counterparts, if even such counterparts exist. In fact, Marx accuses the token historian of ignoring the fundamental aspects of actual human activity while instead concentrating upon non-actualized ideas at best and imaginary metaphysical concepts at worst. "History is nothing but the succession of separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, capital, and productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations." Marx resists any abstraction from this idea, believing that his materialistic ideas alone stand supported by empirical evidence which seems impossible to the Hegelian. His history then begin...

Alzheimers Disease Essay -- Health Memory Diseases Essays

Alzheimer's Disease, progressive brain disorder that causes a gradual and irreversible decline in memory, language skills, perception of time and space, and, eventually, the ability to care for oneself. First described by German psychiatrist Alois Alzheimer in 1906, Alzheimer's disease was initially thought to be a rare condition affecting only young people, and was referred to as presenile dementia. Today late-onset Alzheimer's disease is recognised as the most common cause of the loss of mental function in those aged 65 and over. Alzheimer's in people in their 30s, 40s, and 50s, called early-onset Alzheimer's disease, occurs much less frequently, accounting for less than 10 percent of the estimated 4 million Alzheimer's cases in the United States. Although Alzheimer's disease is not a normal part of the aging process, the risk of developing the disease increases, as people grow older. About 10 percent of the United States population over the age of 65 is affected by Alzheimer's disease, and nearly 50 percent of those over age 85 may have the disease. Alzheimer's disease takes a devastating toll, not only on the patients, but also on those who love and care for them. Some patients experience immense fear and frustration as they struggle with once commonplace tasks and slowly lose their independence. Family, friends, and especially those who provide daily care suffer immeasurable pain and stress as they witness Alzheimer's disease slowly take their loved one from them. The onset of Alzheimer's disease is usually very gradual. In the early stages, Alzheimer's patients have relatively mild problems learning new information and remembering where they have left common objects, such as keys or a wallet. In time, they begin to have trouble recollecting recent events and finding the right words to express themselves. As the disease progresses, patients may have difficulty remembering what day or month it is, or finding their way around familiar surroundings. They may develop a tendency to wander off and then be unable to find their way back. Patients often become irritable or withdrawn as they struggle with fear and frustration when once commonplace tasks become unfamiliar and intimidating. Behavioural changes may become more pronounced as patients become paranoid or delusional and unable to engage in normal conversation. Eventually Alzheimer's patients... ...be learned, but as scientists better understand the genetic components of Alzheimer's, the roles of the amyloid precursor protein and the tau protein in the disease, and the mechanisms of nerve cell degeneration, the possibility that a treatment will be developed is more likely. The responsibility for caring for Alzheimer's patients generally falls on their spouses and children. Care givers must constantly be on guard for the possibility of an Alzheimer's patient wandering away or becoming agitated or confused in a manner that jeopardises the patient or others. Coping with a loved one's decline and inability to recognise familiar faces causes enormous pain. The increased burden faced by families is intense, and the life of the Alzheimer's care giver is often called a 36-hour day. Not surprisingly, care givers often develop health and psychological problems of their own as a result of this stress. The Alzheimer's Association, a national organisation with local chapters throughout the United States, was formed in 1980 in large measure to provide support for Alzheimer's care givers. Today, national and local chapters are a valuable source for information, referral, and advice.

Liberal Theory Essay

This memo outlines the liberal approach to theorizing international relations. Like realism, institutionalism, or non-rational approaches, it is a name given to a family of related theories of international relations. Here it will not be used, as many use it in international relations, to designate theories that stress the importance of international institutions. Nor to designate theories that stress the importance of universal, altruistic or utopian values of a liberal sort, such as human rights or democracy. Nor to designate theories favored by left-wing (â€Å"liberal†) political parties or policies in the US. Instead, it is a theory that stresses the role of the varied social interests and values of states, and their relevance for world politics. Liberals argue that the universal condition of world politics is globalization. States are, and always have been, embedded in a domestic and transnational society, which creates incentives for economic, social and cultural interaction across borders. State policy may facilitate or block such interactions. Some domestic groups may benefit from or be harmed by such policies, and they pressure government accordingly for policies that facilitate realization of their goals. These social pressures, transmitted through domestic political institutions, define â€Å"state preferences† –that is, the set of substantive social purposes that motivate foreign policy. State preferences give governments an underlying stake in the international issues they face. Since the domestic and transnational social context in which states are embedded varies greatly across space and time, so do state preferences. Without such social concerns that transcend state borders, states would have no rational incentive to engage in world politics at all, but would simply devote their resources to an autarkic and isolated existence. To motivate conflict, cooperation, or any other costly foreign policy action, states must possess sufficiently intense state preferences. The resulting globalization-induced variation in social demands, and thus state preferences, is a fundamental cause of state behavior in world politics. This is the central insight of liberal international relations theory. It can be expressed colloquially in various ways: â€Å"What matters most is what states want, not how they get it. † –or- â€Å"Ends are more important than means. † Liberal theory is distinctive in the nature of the variables it privileges. The liberal focus on variation in socially-determined state preferences distinguishes liberal theory from other theoretical traditions: realism (focusing on variation in coercive power resources), institutionalism (focusing on information), and most non-rational approaches (focusing on patterns of beliefs about appropriate means-ends relationships). In explaining patterns of war, for example, liberals do not look to inter-state imbalances of power, bargaining failure due to private information or uncertainty, or particular non-rational beliefs or propensities of individual leaders, societies, or organizations. Liberals look instead to conflicting state preferences derived from hostile nationalist or political ideologies, disputes over appropriable economic resources, or exploitation of unrepresented political constituencies. For liberals, a necessary condition for war is that social pressures lead one or more â€Å"aggressor† states to possess â€Å"revisionist† preferences so extreme or risk-acceptant that other states are unwilling to submit. Three specific variants of liberal theory are defined by particular types of preferences, their variation, and their impact on state behavior. Ideational liberal theories link state behavior to varied conceptions of desirable forms of cultural, political, socioeconomic order. Commercial liberal theories stress economic interdependence, including many variants of â€Å"endogenous policy theory. Republican liberal theories stress the role of domestic representative institutions, elites and leadership dynamics, and executive-legislative relations. Such theories were first conceived by prescient liberals such as Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, John Hobson, Woodrow Wilson, and John Maynard Keynes-writing well before the deep causes (independent variables) they stress (e. g. democratization, industrialization, nationalism, and welfare provision) were widespread. This essay introduces the liberal approach in three steps. It presents two distinctive assumptions underlying and distinguishing liberal theories. Then it further explicates the three variants of liberal theory that follow from these assumptions. Finally, it reviews some distinctive strengths that liberal theories tend to share vis-a-vis other types of international relations theory. Two Unique Assumptions underlying Liberal Theory What basic assumptions underlie the liberal approach? Two assumptions liberal theory make are the assumptions of anarchy and rationality. Specifically, states (or other political actors) exist in an anarchic environment and they generally act in a broadly rational way in making decisions. 2] The anarchy assumption means that political actors exist in the distinctive environment of international politics, without a world government or any other authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. They must engage in self-help. The rationality assumption means that state leaders and their domestic supporters engage in foreign policy for the instrumental purpose of securing benefits provided by (or avoiding costs imposed by) actors outside of their borders, and in making such calculations, states seek to deploy the most cost-effective means to achieve whatever their ends (preferences) may be. Liberal theory shares the first (anarchy) assumption with almost all international relations theories, and it shares the second (rationality) assumption with realism and institutionalism, but not non-rationalist process theories. Liberal theories are distinguished from other rationalist theories, such as realism and institutionalism, by two unique assumptions about world politics: (1) States represent social groups, whose views constitute state preferences; and (2) Interdependence among state preferences influences state policy. Let us consider each in turn. Assumption One: States Represent Societal Preferences The first assumption shared by liberal theories is that states represent some subset of domestic society, whose views constitute state preferences. For liberals, the state is a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction, by domestic social coalitions. These social coalitions define state â€Å"preferences† in world politics at any point in time: the â€Å"tastes,† â€Å"ends,† â€Å"basic interests,† or â€Å"fundamental social purposes† that underlie foreign policy. Political institutions constitute a critical â€Å"transmission belt† by which these interests of individuals and groups in civil society enter the political realm. All individuals and groups do not wield equal influence over state policy. To the contrary, their power varies widely, depending on the context. Variation in the precise nature of representative institutions and practices helps define which groups influence the â€Å"national interest. † Some states may represent, ideal-typically, the preferences of a single tyrannical individual, a Pol Pot or Josef Stalin; others afford opportunities for broad democratic participation. Most lie in between. The precise preferences of social groups, weighted by their domestic power, shape the underlying goals (â€Å"state preferences†) that states pursue in world politics. Sometimes, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors may form transnational alliances to assist social forces. â€Å"State-society relations†Ã¢â‚¬â€the relationship between a state and its domestic (and transnational) society in which it is embedded—lies at the center of liberal theory. [3] Liberals believe that state preferences cannot be reduced to some simple metric or preference ordering, such as seeking â€Å"security† or â€Å"wealth†. Most modern states are not Spartan: They compromise security or sovereignty in order to achieve other ends, or, indeed, just to save money. Nor do modern states uniformly seek â€Å"wealth. † Instead they strike rather strike complex and varied trade-offs among economic, social and political goals. Nor, finally do they seek â€Å"power† in the sense of â€Å"domination†: Many countries would clearly rather spend money on â€Å"butter† rather than â€Å"guns. To see how consequential the variation in goals can be, one need look no further than the implications for international relations of Germany’s evolution from Adolf Hitler’s preference for militant nationalism, fascist rule, autarky, and ruthless exploitation of German Lebensraum under Das Dritte Reich to the social compro mise underlying the postwar Bundesrepublik Deutschland, which favored capitalist democracy, expanding German exports, and peaceful reunification. Similarly one can look at the striking change in policy between Maoist and post-Maoist China, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, Imperial and post-Imperial Japan, and so on. Assumption Two: Interdependence among State Preferences Influences State Behavior The second core assumption shared by liberal theories is that the interdependence among of state preferences influences state behavior. Rather than treating preferences as a fixed constant, as do realists or institutionalists, liberals seek to explain variation in preferences and its significance for world politics. The precise distribution and nature of the â€Å"stakes† explains differences in state policy and behavior. States, liberals argue, orient their behavior to the precise nature of these underlying preferences: compatible or conflictual, intense or weak, and their precise scope. States require a â€Å"social purpose† — a perceived underlying stake in the matter at hand — in order to pay any attention to international affairs, let alone to provoke conflict, inaugurate cooperation, or take any other significant foreign policy action. If there is no such interdependence among state objectives, a rational state will conduct no international relations, satisfying itself with an isolated and autarkic existence. Conflictual goals increase the incentive for of political disputes. Convergence of underlying preferences creates the preconditions for peaceful coexistence or cooperation. The critical theoretical link between state preferences, on the one hand, and state behavior, on the other, is the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence refers to the distribution and interaction of preferences—that is, the extent to which the pursuit of state preferences necessarily imposes costs and benefits (known as policy externalities) upon other states, independent of the â€Å"transaction costs† imposed by the specific strategic means chosen to obtain them. Depending on the underlying pattern of interdependence, each of the qualitative categories above, the form, substance, and depth of conflict and cooperation vary according to the precise nature and intensity of preferences. The existence of some measure of divergent fundamental beliefs, scarcity of material goods, and inequalities in domestic political power among states and social actors renders inevitable some measure of pluralism and competition among and within states. Unlike realists such as Waltz and Morgenthau, liberals do not assume these divergent interests are uniformly zero-sum. At the same time, liberals reject the utopian notion (often attributed to them by realists) of an automatic harmony of interest among individuals and groups in international society. Nor do liberals argue, as realists like Morgenthau charge, believe that each state pursues an ideal goal, oblivious of what other states do. Liberals argue instead that each state seeks to realize distinct preferences or interests under constraints imposed by the different interests of other states. [4] This distribution of preferences varies considerably. For liberals, this variation—not realism’s distribution of capabilities or institutionalism’s distribution of information—is of decisive causal importance in explaining state behavior. A few examples illustrate how liberal theories differ from realist, institutionalist or non-rational ones. We have already encountered the example of war in the introduction, in which liberals stress states with aggressive preferences, rather than imbalances of power, incomplete information, or non-rational beliefs and processes. Another illustration is trade policy. Economists widely agree that free trade is superior welfare-improving policy choice for states, yet trade protection is often practiced. To explain protectionism, liberals look to domestic social preferences. An important factor in almost all countries is the competitive position of affected economic sectors in global markets, which generates domestic and transnational distributional effects: Protectionism is generally backed by producers who are globally uncompetitive; free trade by producers who are globally competitive. Moreover, even if the state is a net beneficiary from free trade, domestic adjustment costs may be too high to tolerate politically, or may endanger other countervailing domestic social objectives, such as domestic social equality or environmental quality. Certain domestic political institutions, such as non-parliamentary legislative systems, which governed US trade policy before 1934, grant disproportionate power to protectionist interests. This differs from realist explanations of trade protectionism, which tend to stress the role of â€Å"hegemonic power† in structuring trade liberalization, or the need to defend self-sufficient national security within the prevailing zero-sum geopolitical competition, perhaps by maintaining self-sufficiency or by aiding allies at the expense of purely economic objectives. Institutionalists might cite the absence of appropriate international institutions, or other means to manage the complex informational tasks and collective action problems—negotiation, dispute resolution, enforcement—required to manage free trade. Those who focus on non-rational theories (psychological, cultural, organizational, epistemic, perceptual or bureaucratic) might stress an ideological disposition to accept â€Å"mercantilist† theory, shared historical analogies, and the psychological predisposition to avoid losses. To further illustrate the importance of patterns of policy interdependence, consider the following three circumstances: zero-sum, harmonious and mixed preferences. In the case of zero-sum preferences, attempts by dominant social groups in one state to realize their preferences through international action may necessarily impose costs on dominant social groups in other countries. This is a case of â€Å"zero-sum† preferences, similar to the â€Å"realist† world. Governments face a bargaining game with few mutual gains and a high potential for interstate tension and conflict. Many ancient cities and states, including those of Ancient Athens, often imposed imperial tribute on defeated neighbors or, in extremis, killed the male population, cast women and children into slavery, and repopulated the town with their own citizens—a situation approximating zero-sum conflict. Today, it might still be argued that there are certain cases—trade in agricultural goods by industrial democracies, for example—where entrenched national interests are so strong that no government seriously considers embracing free trade. In the case of harmonious preferences, where the externalities of unilateral olicies are optimal (or insignificant) for others, there are strong incentives for quiet coexistence with low conflict and (at most) simple forms of interstate coordination. For example, advanced industrial democracies today no longer contemplate waging war on one another, and in some areas governments have agreed to mutual recognition of certain legal standards without controversy. One case of mixed preferences is bargaining, where states can achieve common gains (or avoid common losses, as with a war) if they agree to coordinate their behavior, but may disagree strongly on the distribution of benefits or adjustment costs. Under such circumstances, one of the most important determinants of bargaining power is the intensity of the preferences of each party; the more intense their preference for a beneficial settlement, the more likely they are to make concessions (or employ coercive means) in order to achieve it. Another situation of mixed motives is a situation where interstate coordination can avoid significant risks and costs, as in agreement to avoid naval incidents at sea, or to share information on infectious diseases. In such situations, institutional pre-commitments and the provision of greater information can often improve the welfare of all parties. Liberals derive several distinctive conceptions of power, very different from that of realism. One form of international influence, for liberals, stems from the interdependence among preferences that Keohane and Nye (Power and Interdependence) call â€Å"asymmetrical interdependence. † All other things equal, the more interdependent a state is, the more intense its preference for a given outcome, the more power others potentially have over it; while the less a state wants something, the less a state cares about outcomes, the less intense its preferences, the less power others have over it. Situations of asymmetrical interdependence, where one state has more intense preference for an agreement than another, create bargaining power. In trade negotiations, for example, smaller and poorer countries are often more dependent on trade and thus benefit more from free trade, and thus tend to have a weaker position and make more concessions in the course of negotiations. Enlargement of the European Union is a recent instance. Relative preference intensity can also influence the outcome of war, but in a different way. Nations are in fact rarely prepared to mortgage their entire economy or military in conflict, so their power depends not on their coercive power resources, but on their resolve or will. This is why smaller states often prevail over larger ones. Vietnam, for example, did not prevail over the US in the Vietnam War because it possessed more coercive power resources, but because it had a more intense preference at stake. From Assumptions to Theories Taken by themselves, these liberal assumptions—the international system is anarchic, states are rational, social pressures define state preferences, interdependence among preferences dictates state behavior—are thin. They exclude most existing realist, institutionalist, and non-rational theories, but they do not, taken by themselves, define very precisely the positive content of liberal theory. Some might rightly complain that simply pointing to state preferences opens up an unmanageably wide range of hypothetical social influences on policy. Yet, in practice, research has shown that, in practice, the range of viable liberal theories that test out empirically are relatively few, focused, and powerful. Three broad variants or categories of liberal theory exist: ideational, commercial, and republican liberalism. At the core of each lies a distinct conception of the social pressures and representative institutions that define state preferences, and the consequences for state behavior. Some of these have proven, empirically, to be among the most powerful theories in international relations. Let us consider each in turn.

USS Indianapolis - World War II

USS Indianapolis - World War II USS Indianapolis - Overview: Nation: United States Type: Portland-class heavy cruiser Shipyard: New York Shipbuilding Co. Laid Down: March 31, 1930 Launched: November 7, 1931 Commissioned: November 15, 1932 Fate: Sunk July 30, 1945 by I-58 Specifications: Displacement: 33,410 tons Length: 639 ft., 5 in. Beam: 90 ft. 6 in. Draft:: 30 ft. 6 in. Propulsion: 8 White-Foster boilers, single reduction geared turbines Speed: 32.7 knots Complement: 1,269 (wartime) Armament: Guns 8 x 8-inch (3 turrets with 3 guns each)8 x 5-inch guns Aircraft 2 x OS2U Kingfishers USS Indianapolis - Construction: Laid down on March 31, 1930, USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was the second of two Portland-class built by the US Navy. An improved version of the earlier Northampton-class, the Portlands were slightly heavier and mounted a larger number of 5-inch guns. Built at the New York Shipbuilding Company in Camden, NJ, Indianapolis was launched on November 7, 1931. Commissioned at the Philadelphia Navy Yard the following November, Indianapolis departed for its shakedown cruise in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Returning in February 1932, the cruiser underwent a minor refit before sailing to Maine. USS Indianapolis - Prewar Operations: Embarking President Franklin Roosevelt at Campobello Island, Indianapolis steamed to Annapolis, MD where the ship entertained members of the cabinet. That September Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson came aboard and used the cruiser for an inspection tour of installations in the Pacific. After participating in a number of fleet problems and training exercises, Indianapolis again embarked the President for a Good Neighbor Tour of South America in November 1936. Arriving home, the cruiser was dispatched to the West Coast for service with the US Pacific Fleet. USS Indianapolis - World War II: On December 7, 1941, as the Japanese were attacking Pearl Harbor, Indianapolis was conducting fire training off Johnston Island. Racing back to Hawaii, the cruiser immediately joined Task Force 11 to search for the enemy. In early 1942, Indianapolis sailed with the carrier USS Lexington and conducted raids in Southwest Pacific against Japanese bases on New Guinea. Ordered to Mare Island, CA for an overhaul, the cruiser returned to action that summer and joined US forces operating in the Aleutians. On August 7, 1942, Indianapolis joined in the bombardment of Japanese positions on Kiska. Remaining in northern waters, the cruiser sank the Japanese cargo ship Akagane Maru on February 19, 1943. That May, Indianapolis supported US troops as they recaptured Attu. It fulfilled a similar mission in August during the landings on Kiska. Following another refit at Mare Island, Indianapolis arrived at Pearl Harbor and was made flagship of Vice Admiral Raymond Spruances 5th Fleet. In this role, it sailed as part of Operation Galvanic on November 10, 1943. Nine days later, it provided fire support as US Marines prepared to land on Tarawa. Following the US advance across the central Pacific, Indianapolis saw action off Kwajalein and supported US air strikes across the western Carolines. In June 1944, the 5th Fleet provided support for the invasion of the Marianas. On June 13, the cruiser opened fire on Saipan before being dispatched to attack Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. Returning, the cruiser took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19, before resuming operations around Saipan. As the battle in the Marianas wound down, Indianapolis was sent to aid in the invasion of Peleliu that September. After brief refit at Mare Island, the cruiser joined Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitschers fast carrier task force on February 14, 1945, shortly before it attacked Tokyo. Steaming south, they aided in the landings on Iwo Jima while continuing to attack the Japanese home islands. On March 24, 1945, Indianapolis took part in the preinvasion bombardment of Okinawa. A week later, the cruiser was hit by kamikaze while off the island. Hitting Indianapolis stern, the kamikazes bomb penetrated through the ship and exploded in the water underneath. After making temporary repairs, the cruiser limped home to Mare Island. Entering the yard, the cruiser underwent extensive repair to the damage. Emerging in July 1945, the ship was tasked with the secret mission of carrying the parts for the atomic bomb to Tinian in the Marianas. Departing on July 16, and steaming at high speed, Indianapolis made record time covering 5,000 miles in ten days. Unloading the components, the ship received orders to proceed to Leyte in the Philippine and then on to Okinawa. Leaving Guam on July 28, and sailing unescorted on a direct course, Indianapolis crossed paths with the Japanese submarine I-58 two days later. Opening fire around 12:15 AM on July 30, I-58 hit Indianapolis with two torpedoes on its starboard side. Critically damaged, the cruiser sank in twelve minutes forcing around 880 survivors into the water. Due to the rapidity of the ships sinking, few life rafts were able to be launched and most of the men had only lifejackets. As the ship was operating on a secret mission, no notification had been sent to Leyte alerting them that Indianapolis was en route. As a result, it was not reported as overdue. Though three SOS messages were sent before the ship sank, they were not acted on for various reasons. For the next four days, Indianapolis surviving crew endured dehydration, starvation, exposure, and terrifying shark attacks. Around 10:25 AM on August 2, the survivors were spotted by a US aircraft conducting a routine patrol. Dropping a radio and life raft, the aircraft reported its position and all possible units were dispatched to the scene. Of the approximately 880 men who went into the water, only 321 were rescued with four of those later dying from their wounds. Among the survivors was Indianapolis commanding officer, Captain Charles Butler McVay III. After the rescue, McVay was court-martialed and convicted for failing to follow an evasive, zig-zag course. Due to evidence that the Navy had put the ship in danger and the testimony of Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto, I-58s captain, which stated that an evasive course would not have mattered, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz remitted McVays conviction and restored him to active duty. Despite this, many of the crewmembers families blamed him for the sinking and he later committed suicide in 1968.

A Hero Like a Hurricane

A Hero Like a Hurricane “Im your RA Katrina, like the hurricane,” she had said when we first met. It sounded strange, a bit intimidating even. Stranger still was her first piece of advice, a warning to shave our heads while were still young. She was blunt, yet not offensive; confident, yet not arrogant. Even when she didnt speak a word, her presence was always unconsciously pronounced and obvious. Her enthusiastic words of encouragement and acts of selflessness, even the smallest ones, became a source of great inspiration and helped to broaden my opinions.During conversations, Katrina usually got very quiet, subliminally signifying to us that she was trying to analyze everyones opinions and personalities. She always had the last word and concluded every conversation. Her presence and humility always were clearly prominent.I still remember one night when I foolishly locked myself out of the dorm at midnight and had no other choice but to ask for Katrinas assistance.2005-8-25 Hurricane KatrinaAlthough she had just awoken, her response was swift and she quickly made her way three floors down to the far side of the building to retrieve a spare key. Perhaps she was just doing her job, but there have been other occurrences where other RAs were not as selfless and ignored their students to gain some sleep.Next year, Katrina is fulfilling her dream by joining the Peace Corps, traveling to Africa, and shaving off all her shoulder-length red hair. Her selfless goals to better the environment and her determination to achieve them, inspires me to make similar goals. As her last piece of advice, Katrina hoped to inspire us further, telling us to never waste our “one wild and precious life.”My admiration for someone only seven years older than me grew not only because of her selflessness but also from...